Brief for Respondents in No. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 504 (1989). Bd. Racial imbalance is the failure of a school districts individual schools to match or approximate the demographic makeup of the student population at large. 2 Memorandum of Agreement between Seattle School District No. [Footnote 11] But see Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U. S. 547, 610 (1990) (We are a Nation not of black and white alone, but one teeming with divergent communities knitted together with various traditions and carried forth, above all, by individuals) (OConnor, J., dissenting). It therefore reversed the lower courts original finding of no discrimination and remanded, instructing the lower court to issue an injunction to prevent the District from using this system. We granted certiorari, and now reverse. This working backward to achieve a particular type of racial balance, rather than working forward from some demonstration of the level of diversity that provides the purported benefits, is a fatal flaw under our existing precedent. Ostate-imposed desegregation could only be brought about by busing children across school districts. United States v. Fordice, 505 U. S. 717, 749 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring). 7045 and 7291 (WD Ky., July 30, 1975) (1975 Judgment and Findings). Since the Court granted writ over these objections, it seems likely that it will find jurisdiction exists. 2. Federal authorities had claimedas the NAACP and the OCR did in Seattlethat Clarke County schools were segregated in law, not just in fact. 1117, 2528. The student population of the school district is approximately 40% white, 60% non-white. They asked the court to dissolve the desegregation order and to hold the use of magnet school racial guidelines unconstitutional. Although remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination is a compelling interest under the strict scrutiny test, see Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U. S. 467, 494, that interest is not involved here because the Seattle schools were never segregated by law nor subject to court-ordered desegregation, and the desegregation decree to which the Jefferson County schools were previously subject has been dissolved. All this is true enough in the contexts in which these statements were madegovernment contracting, voting districts, allocation of broadcast licenses, and electing state officersbut when it comes to using race to assign children to schools, history will be heard. Neither of the parties has arguednor could theythat race-based student assignment is necessary to provide a bulwark against anarchy or to prevent violence. Section 1. Here again, though, the dissent overstates the data that supposedly support the interest. Arkansas, for example, provides by statute that [n]o student may transfer to a nonresident district where the percentage of enrollment for the students race exceeds that percentage in the students resident district. Ark. 733 (1998). The plan forbade transfers, however, if the transfer would lead to a school population outside the guideline range, i.e., if it would create a school where fewer than 15% or more than 50% of the students were black. The only support todays dissent can draw from Grutter must be found in its various separate opinions, not in the opinion filed for the Court. It contends that these values which the Court recognized as important to the Michigan Law School are even more important at the high school level because not all students will go to college, meaning high school is the last chance for the educational system to instill in them these civic virtues. 1, supra, at 461; Hanawalt 40. 1. in . The racial breakdown of this nonwhite group is approximately 23.8 percent Asian-American, 23.1 percent African-American, 10.3 percent Latino, and 2.8 percent Native-American. Moreover, giving some degree of weight to a local school boards knowledge, expertise, and concerns in these particular matters is not inconsistent with rigorous judicial scrutiny. The Court rejected the interests asserted to justify the layoff program as insufficiently compelling. of Cal. Simply because the school districts may seek a worthy goal does not mean they are free to discriminate on the basis of race to achieve it, or that their racial classifications should be subject to less exacting scrutiny. For this reason, among others, I do not join Parts IIIB and IV. The opinion of the Court and Justice Breyers dissenting opinion (hereinafter dissent) describe in detail the history of integration efforts in Louisville and Seattle. Second, if the schools racial make-up was more than 15 percent out of line with the overall racial composition of the school district (classified only as white and nonwhite), then the students race was considered. In respect to elementary schools, the plan first drew a neighborhood line around each elementary school, and it then drew a second line around groups of elementary schools (called clusters). The districts offer no evidence that the level of racial diversity necessary to achieve the asserted educational benefits happens to coincide with the racial demographics of the respective districts, or rather the districts white/nonwhite or black/other balance, since that is the only diversity addressed by the plans. Most white families live north of the downtown area where four high schools Ballard, Ingraham, Nathan Hale, and Roosevelt are located. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U. S. 467, 495 (1992). . Const., Amdt. But see ante, at 29. as Amici Curiae, with Rosen, Perhaps Not All Affirmative Action is Created Equal, N.Y. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Brief for Petitioners at 27. (b)The plurality opinion is too dismissive of governments legitimate interest in ensuring that all people have equal opportunity regardless of their race. It is an interest in maintaining hard-won gains. If the Primary 1 (Kindergarten) placement does not enhance racial balance, a new application must be completed for Primary 2 (Grade One)). CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. denied, 389 U. S. 847 (1967); Springfield School Comm. of Ed., 439 U. S. 1380, 1383 (1978), and by the host of state court decisions cited by Justice Breyer, see post, 2527,[Footnote 8] were fully consistent with that disposition. Therefore, it took the unusual step of certifying a question for the Washington Supreme Court to answer before it decided the appeal. Between 80% and 90% of all students received their first choice assignment; between 89% and 97% received their first or second choice assignment. During the period the tiebreaker applied, it typically affected about 300 students per year. 1" (2007) and "Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education" (2007), the high court forbade those . See, e.g., post, at 1920. Regardless of its name, however, the interest at stake possesses three essential elements. 05908, at 36 (For Seattle, racial balance is clearly not an end in itself but rather a measure of the extent to which the educational goals the plan was designed to foster are likely to be achieved). 05-908, was filed by a group of parents who had formed a nonprofit corporation to. Most white families live north of the downtown area where four high schoolsBallard, Ingraham, Nathan Hale, and Rooseveltare located. That school was founded in 1990 as part of the school boards effort to increase academic achievement.[Footnote 12] See African American Academy History, online at http://www. Finally, what of the hope and promise of Brown? Section 5. The Grutter Court expressly limited its holdingdefining a specific type of broad-based diversity and noting the unique context of higher educationbut these limitations were largely disregarded by the lower courts in extending Grutter to the sort of classifications at issue here. Moreover, these cases are not governed by Grutter v. Just prior to the plans implementation, for example, 4 of Seattles 11 high schools were imbalanced, i.e., almost exclusively black or almost exclusively white. By 1979, only two were out of balance. By 1980 only Cleveland remained out of balance (as the board defined it) and that by a mere two students. However, Roberts considers that this interest is not compelling and that the use of race for this goal is not narrowly tailored, it is instead used for racial balancing, which is unconstitutional. For the foregoing reasons, this conclusory argument cannot sustain the plans. Justice Breyer also suggests that other means for achieving greater racial diversity in schools are necessarily unconstitutional if the racial classifications at issue in these cases cannot survive strict scrutiny. Another 16% received an acceptable choice. 1, 458 U. S., at 472473. Opinions differed. Section 2. [Footnote 27] Whatever else the Courts rejection of the segregationists arguments in Brown might have established, it certainly made clear that state and local governments cannot take from the Constitution a right to make decisions on the basis of race by adverse possession. Rather, this Court must assess independently the nature of the interest asserted and the evidence to support it in order to determine whether it qualifies as compelling under our precedents. Justice Thomas suggests that it will be easy to identify de jure segregation because [i]n most cases, there either will or will not have been a state constitutional amendment, state statute, local ordinance, or local administrative policy explicitly requiring separation of the races. Ante, at 6, n.4 (concurring opinion). However closely related race-based assignments may be to achieving racial balance, that itself cannot be the goal, whether labeled racial diversity or anything else. Brief for Petitioner at 3536. But what was constitutionally required of the district prior to 2000 was the elimination of the vestiges of prior segregationnot racial proportionality in its own right. This school was 10 miles from home, and Meredith sought to transfer Joshua to a school in a different cluster, Bloom Elementary, whichlike his resides schoolwas only a mile from home. Thus, only by ignoring Grutters reasoning can the dissent claim that recognizing a compelling interest in these cases is an a fortiori application of Grutter. 1, 458 U. S. 457, 472, n.15 (1982), post, at 5657, but there this Court expressly noted that it was not passing on the propriety of race-conscious student assignments in the absence of a finding of de jure segregation. It is my firm conviction that no Member of the Court that I joined in 1975 would have agreed with today's decision. [Footnote 13]. to achieve its own ends; and thus it fails to pass strict scrutiny. The complaint alleged that the Seattle School Board had created or perpetuated unlawful racial segregation through, e.g., certain school-transfer criteria, a construction program that needlessly built new schools in white areas, district line-drawing criteria, the maintenance of inferior facilities at black schools, the use of explicit racial criteria in the assignment of teachers and other staff, and a general pattern of delay in respect to the implementation of promised desegregation efforts. Jefferson County Public Schools operates the public school system in metropolitan Louisville, Kentucky. Once those vestiges were eliminated, Jefferson County was on the same footing as any other school district, and its use of race must be justified on other grounds. 1? See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Written and curated by real attorneys at Quimbee. 05-908, at 38a-39a, 45a. The dissents appeal to stare decisis, post, at 65, is particularly ironic in light of its apparent willingness to depart from these precedents, post, at 3637. 1961) (If men were angels, no government would be necessary). Cf. [Footnote 14] Allowing racial balancing as a compelling end in itself would effectively assur[e] that race will always be relevant in American life, and that the ultimate goal of eliminating entirely from governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human beings race will never be achieved. Croson, supra, at 495 (plurality opinion of OConnor, J.) See ibid. In design and operation, the plans are directed only to racial balance, an objective this Court has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate. 3, p.17 (The Court is dealing with thousands of local school districts and schools. Upon realizing that the litigation would not be resolved in time for assignment decisions for the 20022003 school year, the Ninth Circuit withdrew its opinion, 294 F.3d 1084 (2002) (Parents Involved III), vacated the injunction, and, pursuant to Wash. Rev. The wide variety of different integration plans that school districts use throughout the Nation suggests that the problem of racial segregation in schools, including de facto segregation, is difficult to solve. The findings should define the scope of any injury [and] the necessary remedy, id., at 505, and must be more than inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs, id., at 506. [29] The districts have also failed to show that they considered methods other than explicit racial classifications to achieve their stated goals. of City School Dist. Public Schools, 330 F.Supp. Others have been more circumspect. Pp. As to recruiting faculty on the basis of race, both cities have tried, but only as one part of a broader program. With this factual background in mind, I turn to the legal question: Does the United States Constitution prohibit these school boards from using race-conscious criteria in the limited ways at issue here? to reject the argument that a race-conscious plan is permissible only when there has been a judicial finding of de jure segregation. 610 F.2d, at 663664. Those lower court judges reasoned that programs like these are not aimed at oppressing blacks and do not seek to give one racial group an edge over another. Comfort, supra, at 27 (Boudin, C.J., concurring); 426 F.3d, at 1193 (Kozinski, J., concurring). By 1984, after several schools had fallen out of compliance with the orders racial percentages due to shifting demographics in the community, the school board revised its desegregation plan. ospi.k12. The citations do not carry the significance the districts would ascribe to them. App. Adarand, 515 U. S., at 228229. That is a gamble I am unwilling to take, and it is one the Constitution does not allow. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. Id., at 39a40a. "[27], Part III C[14] addressed the school districts' claim that "the way in which they have employed individual racial classifications is necessary to achieve their stated ends." There has been considerable interest in this case, as demonstrated by the extraordinary number (approximately sixty) of amicus briefs filed in the case. Moreover, these cases are not governed by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 328, in which the Court held that, for strict scrutiny purposes, a government interest in student body diversity in the context of higher education is compelling. Seattles racial tiebreaker results, in the end, only in shifting a small number of students between schools. 935, 937 (1989) (calling Brown the Supreme Courts greatest anti-discrimination decision); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Brown, 347 U. S. 483; Dudziak, Brown as a Cold War Case, 91 J. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. 1 Complaint in Adams v. Forbes Bottomly, Civ. Laws arise from a culture and vice versa. 161, 170, 212 A. See Appendix A, infra. ); internal quotation marks omitted). If the racial demographics of any school's student body deviated by more than a predetermined number of percentage points from those of Seattle's total student population (approximately 41% white and 59% non-white), the racial tiebreaker went into effect. The plurality, or at least those who follow Justice Thomas color-blind approach, see ante, at 2627 (Thomas, J., concurring); Grutter, 539 U. S., at 353354 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), may feel confident that, to end invidious discrimination, one must end all governmental use of race-conscious criteria including those with inclusive objectives. These statements nowhere suggest that this freedom is limited to school districts where court-ordered desegregation measures are also in effect. In 2000, for example, Roosevelt was the most popular first choice high school in Seattle; in 2001, Ballard was the most popular; in 2000, West Seattle was one of the least popular; by 2003, it was one of the more popular. The Court deferred to local authorities in making its determination, noting that in inquiring into reasonableness there must necessarily be a large discretion on the part of the legislature. Ibid. Ibid. That is what is at issue here. Approximately 34 percent of the districts 97,000 students are black; most of the remaining 66 percent are white. The cases here were argued upon the assumption, and come to us on the premise, that the discrimination in question did not result from de jure actions. It is hard to understand how a plan that could allow these results can be viewed as being concerned with achieving enrollment that is broadly diverse, Grutter, supra, at 329. First, there is a historical and remedial element: an interest in setting right the consequences of prior conditions of segregation. Moreover, maintaining this federally mandated system of classification makes sense insofar as Seattles experience indicates that the relevant circumstances in respect to each of these different minority groups are roughly similar, e.g., in terms of residential patterns, and call for roughly similar responses. The plurality refers to no case in support of its demand. Similarly, between 1968 and 1980, the number of black children attending schools that were more than 90% minority fell from 64% to 33% in the Nation (from 78% to 23% in the South), but that too reversed direction, rising by the year 2000 from 33% to 37% in the Nation (from 23% to 31% in the South). Though the dissent cites every manner of complaint, record material, and scholarly article relating to Seattles race-based student assignment efforts, post, at 7375, it cites no law or official policy that required separation of the races in Seattles schools. The plan required that each elementary school in the district maintain 20% to 40% enrollment of African-American students, corresponding to the racial composition of the district. [Footnote 30] See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. By limiting the School Districts use of race, it will be more difficult for it to cure these defects. See, e.g., Swann, supra, at 2627; Montgomery Co. Bd. Thus about 2,000 students out of a total district population of about 60,000 students were involved in one or the other transfer program. . In a footnote the Justice added a personal mention of Justice Breyer: "Justice Breyer's good intentions, which I do not doubt, have the shelf life of Justice Breyer's tenure. Eleven other States require local boards to deny transfers that are As well, the District points out that it is no longer using the admission system that serves as the basis of this suit, and has not for several years, further demonstrating that any future injury is far from imminent. 1. I quote the Illinois Supreme Court at length to illustrate the prevailing legal assumption at the time Swann was decided. The fact that racial discrimination was preferable to the relevant communities was irrelevant to the Brown Court. of Boston, the Illinois Supreme Court had issued an unpublished opinion holding unconstitutional a similar statute aimed at eliminating racial imbalance in public schools. Croson, supra, at 505; Wygant, supra, at 279, n.5 (plurality opinion). See Johnson, supra, at 505 (We have insisted on strict scrutiny in every context, even for so-called benign racial classifications); Adarand, 515 U. S., at 227 (rejecting idea that benign racial classifications may be held to different standard); Croson, 488 U. S., at 500 (Racial classifications are suspect, and that means that simple legislative assurances of good intention cannot suffice). The cost of busing, the harm that members of all racial communities feared that the Seattle Plan caused, the desire to attract white families back to the public schools, and the interest in providing greater school choice led the board to abandon busing and to substitute a new student assignment policy that resembles the plan now before us. The plurality says that cases such as Swann and the others I have described all were decided before this Court definitively determined that all racial classifications . Cf. of Ed., 439 U. S. 1380, 1383 (1978). See id., at 519 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The Seattle school board itself must believe that racial mixing is not necessary to black achievement. Does the Constitution mandate this inefficient result? According to the dissent, integration involves an interest in setting right the consequences of prior conditions of segregation. Post, at 37. Race-based government measures during the 1860s and 1870s to remedy state-enforced slavery were therefore not inconsistent with the color-blind Constitution. Narrow tailoring requires "serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives", Grutter, supra, at 339, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 156 L. Ed. The District further points to the line of Supreme Court cases requiring that schools desegregate even when such segregation was simply the effect of where the districts boundaries were drawn. 2d 854 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part [*2761] and concurring in judgment), "Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. You can explore additional available newsletters here. The plans in both Louisville and Seattle grow out of these earlier remedial efforts. The only counter argument in the record is the Ninth Circuits resolution of the question. Brief for Respondent at 1617. not in compliance with the local school boards desegre- Does the pluralitys view of the Equal Protection Clause mean that courts must give no weight to such a board determination? This context is not a context that involves the use of race to decide who will receive goods or services that are normally distributed on the basis of merit and which are in short supply. One schoolGarfieldis more or less in the center of Seattle. Fourth, the pluralitys approach risks serious harm to the law and for the Nation. In addition, a decision in the Districts favor will allow public schools to implement a wide range of programs designed to further the interest of racial diversity. As early as Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967), this Court made clear that government action that rest[s] solely upon distinctions drawn according to race had to be subjected to the most rigid scrutiny. Id., at 11 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 216 (1944)); see also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 196 (1964) (requiring a statute drawing a racial classification to be necessary, and not merely rationally related, to accomplishment of a permissible state policy); id., at 197 (Harlan, J., concurring) (The necessity test should be equally applicable in a case involving state racial discrimination). The statute establishing MSAP permits granting federal grants to magnet programs that seek to decrease minority group isolation. 20 U.S.C. Thus, the race-based student-assignment plan at issue here, which was instituted the year after the dissolution of the desegregation decree, was not even arguably required by the Constitution. (We consider only the ninth grade since only students entering that class were subject to the tiebreaker, and because the plan was not in place long enough to change the composition of an entire school.) See Bush v. Vera, 517 U. S. 952, 958 (1996) (plurality opinion) (Strict scrutiny does not apply merely because redistricting is performed with consciousness of race. The Seattle case, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. In answering this question, the court must first consider a jurisdictional challenge raised by the District and then, if it finds jurisdiction, consider the merits of this question. of Ed., 439 U. S. 1380, 1383 (1978) (opinion in chambers), making clear that he too believed that Swanns statement reflected settled law: While I have the gravest doubts that [a state supreme court] was required by the United States Constitution to take the [desegregation] action that it has taken in this case, I have very little doubt that it was permitted by that Constitution to take such action. (Emphasis in original.). Parents Involved commenced this suit in the Western District of Washington, alleging that Seattles use of race in assignments violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,[Footnote 4] Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,[Footnote 5] and the Washington Civil Rights Act. The District argues that its use of race in high school admissions serves three compelling government interests: (1) the educational benefits of a diverse student body; (2) the reduction of racial isolation and de facto segregation; and (3) providing equality of opportunity to all students. Several of these cases were significantly more restrictive than Swann in respect to the degree of leniency the Fourteenth Amendment grants to programs designed to include people of all races. App. See McDaniel, supra, at 41. 5455 (What is the great national and federal policy on this matter? A non-profit group, Parents Involved in Community Schools, sued the District, arguing that the racial tiebreaker violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Washington state law. See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Montgomery Cty. Chief Justice Roberts announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, IIIA, and IIIC, and an opinion with respect to Parts IIIB and IV, in which Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito join. For the 2006-2007 school year, the school district has suspended the tiebreaker pending litigation. At that time, about 20% or 12,000 of the districts students were black. A 2007 Supreme Court ruling in Parents Involved in Community Schools vs. Seattle School District #1, limited the. In making an assignment to a particular high school, the district would give first preference to a student with a sibling already at the school. These are not affirmative action plans, and hence individualized scrutiny is simply beside the point. I have explained why I do not believe the Constitution could possibly find compelling the provision of a racially diverse education for a 23-year-old law student but not for a 13-year-old high school pupil.
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